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‘SHINE LIKE A JEWEL’ 




Since the 1980s the criminal justice system in England and Wales has been recalibrated by 
the ideological and material forces of marketisation and competition. Specifically, the 
probation duty to advise, assist, and befriend has been eroded by the instrumental functions of 
punishment and prison. These profound transformations have undermined the ethico-cultural 
foundations of criminal justice, indexed clearly in the privatisation of probation services 
between 2010 and 2015. The original contribution of this article draws upon Kantian 
deontological ethics to critique these events and to re-energise the moral coordinates of 
government policies and organisational practices. It confronts the current orthodoxy with the 
unconditional moral demand of duty and moral obligation. 
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Introduction 
With discernible stirrings in the 1980s, gathering momentum through the 1990s, before 
culminating in the Rehabilitation Revolution of 2010-15, criminal justice in England and 
Wales has been systematically recalibrated by the instruments of economy and efficiency, 
quantifiable targets and measurable outcomes, punishment, prison, and bureaucratic 
rationality. These features have congealed to impose a paradigm shift in governmental 
responses and organisational practices, indexed most notably in subjecting probation to the 
ideological and material signifiers of privatisation, marketisation, and competition. The 
urgent, vital, and original purpose of this article advances the proposition that the historical 
conventions of probation ought not to be fragmented by an instrumentally-driven operation to 
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achieve fiscal efficiencies, provide investment opportunities to the commercial sector, or 
become the subject of governmental will to power over troublesome populations. The 
substantive reason for this proposition is that probation work, in conjunction with youth 
justice, health, welfare, and educational provision, is people-facing. In other words, its 
essential composition is I-thou relations (Buber, 1970) not I-it functions. Organisations that 
work with people as their primary rationale are confronted with what to do as well as how, 
which provoke existential moral questions that transcend instrumental utility. Accordingly, 
there is a fundamental distinction between what is functionally useful and fiscally 
responsible, from what is intrinsically morally right. This distinction has been blurred over 
recent decades. Within the scope of this article people work with offenders includes probation 
services and community rehabilitation companies in England and Wales, ineluctably 
entangled with the coordinates of Kantian inspired personalist sensibilities (Mounier, 1952), 
symbolic conventions, ethical demands and responses. 
 
A supporting contention of this article is the under-theorisation of the criminal justice domain 
(see XX 2015a, 2016 forthcoming). To rectify this deficiency I proceed through an exposition 
of moral philosophy with Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) to forge a thematic association 
between deontological ethics and probation duty, of which the latter was legislatively 
established in 1907. This was sequentially engraved in historical and cultural conventions 
through four substantive documents (Home Office 1909, 1922, 1936, and 1962), and 
inculcated into practice. Next, I proceed into the crisis decade of the 1970s and the path of 
duty abandoned, informed by returning to the Home Office Review (1977), Haxby (1978), 
and the pertinent insights of Robert Harris on moral dissonance (1977, 1980). I also apply 
Kantian ethics to critique criminal justice developments since the 1980s to expose intellectual 
and moral erosion, contingent on the demise of probation duty and the expansion of an 
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internal market of services. Specifically, this article maps the discernible shift in 
organisational rationality from the moral category of advice, assistance, and friendship, to 
delivering expressive and instrumental forms of punishment in the community. This 
empirically verifiable transformation constitutes a significant volte face that has serious 
implications for the dialectics of criminal and social justice. I will suggest that Kantian ethics 
foregrounds salient concepts of significance, a vocabulary of interest, to analyse, critique, but 
also to confront a recent history of moral erosion imposed by successive governments. 
Essentially, this article constitutes an ethical corrective to the political and organisational 
logic of instrumental utility applied to organisational domains, primarily probation and the 
inchoate community rehabilitation companies. It is urgent and timely to address these 
matters, particularly after the revolutionary turbulence of 2010-15, and it is necessary to 
begin by establishing the theoretically abstract platform of Kantian ethics. 
 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant 1785/2005) 
Although Bertrand Russell (1946) was reluctant to endorse the judgement that Kant was the 
pre-eminent modern philosopher, he ascribed historical importance to deontological ethics 
(from the Greek δεόν/deon interpreted as duty, should, or ought). When the Groundwork was 
published in 1785, followed in 1788 with the Critique of Practical Reason, moral philosophy 
had progressed through the natural law formulations of Aquinas, Grotius, and Pufendorf that 
inscribed moral law into the fabric of the universe like some Greek universal logos. Hobbes, 
the anthropological pessimist, asserted that the state was confronted with the necessity to 
impose morality onto self-interested human beings. Later, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson 
expatiated on moral sense, and Hume’s utilitarian approach prioritised feeling over reason in 
ethical evaluation. Bentham’s utilitarianism stated that the criterion to judge right action was 
its usefulness for human happiness (consequentialism). Mathematically, the utilitarian 
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calculus quantified morality conducive to achieving the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number, but at a price. It risked manipulating others to accrue beneficial outcomes to oneself. 
It also put into relief what is useful according to contingent political and economic conditions 
and what is intrinsically right or good (see Schneewind, 2003, for a detailed exposition on 
these different moral perspectives). With Kant, towards the end of the 18th century, the 
history of moral philosophy was presented with a perspective that makes the rightness or 
wrongness of an action independent of the goodness or badness of its consequences 
(Schneewind, 2003: 651). Accordingly, it rejected utility for 'systems which are held to be 
demonstrated by abstract philosophical arguments' (Russell, 1946: 639). In other words, Kant 
advanced a metaphysics of morals in which moral concepts are located a priori in human 
reason. It has been declared with some justification that 'Kant stands at one of the great 
dividing points in the history of ethics' (MacIntyre, 1967: 190). 
 
The Groundwork is theoretically and philosophically complex; for Eagleton (2009: 113) 
decidedly curious; but Kuehn unhesitatingly endorses a 'most impressive work' (2001: 283). 
It is not within my purview to critique its central metaphysical and rationalist contentions (see 
Eagleton, 2009). Rather, I want to extrapolate concepts of significance that can be applied to 
probation work, transformations in criminal justice conventions, which are also applicable to 
other people-facing organisational domains. The Groundwork has three main parts and I am 
indebted to MacIntyre (1967) and Ross (1962) for the following reconstruction: 
 Passage from ordinary rational knowledge of morality to philosophical 
 Passage from popular moral philosophy to a metaphysics of morals 
 Passage from a metaphysics of morals to a critique of pure reason 
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To repeat, the central objective formulates a metaphysics of morals. In doing so, Kant 
differentiates between what is the case or actuality of behaviour, from what ought to be the 
case according to the logical progression of philosophical argument. The latter form of 
knowledge is a priori because it does not depend on observing the actualities of behaviour. 
Copleston explains the difference by suggesting that we cannot 'verify the statement that men 
ought to tell the truth by examining whether they in fact do so or not' (1960/2003: 308-09). 
The statement is true independently of conduct that establishes an objective principle 
compelling to the will, a command of reason that constitutes an a priori imperative in the 
Kantian schema (Russell, 1946: 644). 
 
Kant begins with an exposition of a good will. A good will is considered good not because of 
what it produces, achieves, or its utilitarian consequences, but by virtue of it being good in 
itself. In other words, it has intrinsic value rather than teleological significance. It requires no 
qualification, nor can it be added to something else to produce bad results. Then, in a 
statement of considerable import that is central to this article, it is explained that a good will 
even if 'lacking in power to carry out its intentions, if by its upmost effort it still accomplishes 
nothing, and only good will is left; even then it would still shine like a jewel for its own sake 
as something which has its full value in itself' (1785/2005: 65 italics added). Kant 
acknowledged that the human condition during the Age of Reason was subjected to both 
good and bad impulses, desires and drives, but a good will manifests itself in acting for the 
sake of duty. Duty is a central feature of the moral consciousness and its three propositions 
are:  
 human action is deemed morally good when undertaken for the sake of duty, not 
inclination, desire, the Benthamite pursuit of happiness, or Hobbesian self-interest;  
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 dutiful actions have moral worth when undertaken according to a maxim, principle, or 
motive, not instrumental utility; 
 to act according to duty is the requirement to act out of reverence for the moral law. 
There are Odyssean obstacles to exercising a good will and doing one’s duty. But the moral 
law ought to be obeyed for its own sake. Copleston elucidates by saying that human actions 
'if they are to have moral worth, must be performed out of reverence for the law. Their moral 
worth is derived, according to Kant, not from their results, whether actual or intended, but 
from the maxim of the agent' (1960/2003: 318). Nevertheless, this vocabulary of good will, 
duty, and the moral law, appear philosophically abstract and lacking in content. So how do 
these abstract concepts translate into the concrete moral life? The answer introduces the 
categorical imperative that has three modes of expression: 
 'I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should 
become a universal law' (Kant, 1785/2005: 15) e.g. speak truth not lies 
 Humanity as an end in itself – we cannot and must not use other human beings as the 
means by which we pursue and achieve our own ends 
 Kant refers to the universal legislative will. 
Notwithstanding the defensible merits of Kant’s deontological ethic, there are objections that 
should be noted briefly. Hegel found it too formal and abstract (Pinkard, 2000); Eagleton 
(2009) is bemused; and Schweitzer (1929) cogently argued that reverence for the moral law 
lacked existential human content stating: 'How far Kant is from understanding the problem of 
finding a basic moral principle which has a definite content can be seen from the fact that he 
never gets beyond an utterly narrow conception of the ethical' (1929: 108). Consequently, he 
replaced Kant’s reverence for law with reverence for life. Nevertheless, Schweitzer’s 
evaluation supported the centrality of human beings as ends rather than means, motives rather 
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than consequences, so that the 'utilitarian ethic must abdicate before that of immediate and 
sovereign duty' (1929: 107). A final objection to take seriously is that Kant’s a priori moral 
consciousness is one of history’s naïve assumptions, a metaphysical conjuring trick in its 
mysterious relation with the functioning of human reason and cognitive categories. 
Accordingly, transcendental materialism (see Hall, 2012) confronts the naïvety of 
transcendental idealism by advancing an understanding of morality that is not some fixed 
component of our cognitive apparatus, but inextricably entangled in the configuration of 
drives, desires, and ethical evaluation by ideology. Copleston did not refer to this 
transcendental materialist perspective, but his positive summation was that 'It cannot be 
denied, I think, that there is a certain grandeur in Kant’s ethical theory. His uncompromising 
exaltation of duty, and his insistence on the value of the human personality certainly merit 
respect' (1960/2003: 345). 
 
To summarise, Kant asserted the existence of moral consciousness within rational human 
beings, and isolated the a priori as an unchanging element independent of ephemeral politico-
economic conditions and historical contingencies. He emphasised a good will manifested in 
duty, prioritising motives over consequences. But, MacIntyre asks, how is duty presented to 
us? The answer is that it 'presents itself as obedience to a law that is universally binding on 
all rational beings' (1967: 193). What is the content of this law? Its content is manifested in 
precepts that must be obeyed by all rational human beings, which is the categorical 
imperative. Ultimately, the test of a moral imperative is that it can be universalised. 
According to the Kantian schema human beings are ends, not means, so any attempt at 
calculable manipulation must be avoided. Significantly, Kantian deontology rejected 
utilitarian ethics for a system demonstrable by abstract philosophico-theoretical arguments 
(Russell, 1946: 639), more concerned with the ideal of pure reason than pragmatic decisions 
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in complex human situations (Kuehn, 2001). Nevertheless, the central concepts of 
significance, the primary vocabulary of interest, should not hastily be dismissed which can be 
distilled as follows: a priori, good will, duty, motive, moral consciousness and obligation, 
moral law, ends over means, and respect for human personality. They are applicable in 
forging a thematic link between Kantian deontology and probation duty, which necessitates a 
chronological leap from 1785 to 1907. 
 
From Kantian philosophical abstraction to concrete probation duty 
I have not discovered any qualitative empirical evidence to suggest that the law-makers in 
1907, the Home Secretary Herbert Gladstone, or any of the five members of the Departmental 
Committee appointed by Gladstone on the 8th March 1909, were Kantian ethicists in the 
reforming Liberal government that came to power in 1906. But duty, a salient Kantian moral 
concept, resonated with probation practice from its inception. It is unnecessary to reconstruct 
the early history of the probation system (see Mair and Burke, 2012; Vanstone, 2004; XX and 
XX, 2006). By contrast, it is appropriate to cite Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 
1907 which specified the duties of probation officers: 
a) to visit or receive reports from the person under supervision at such 
reasonable intervals as may be specified in the probation order; 
b) to see that he observes the conditions of his recognisance; 
c) to report to the court as to his behaviour; 
d) to advise, assist and befriend him, and, when necessary, to endeavour to find 
him suitable employment. 
Within one year of the primary legislation, an inquiry was established to determine whether 
full advantage had been taken of the 1907 Act (Home Office, 1909). It is of historical interest 
to note that the probation system was established instead of punishment, prison, and financial 
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penalties. It was also an alternative to industrial and reformatory schools for juveniles. 
Significantly, the system was structured by a relationship of influence between the probation 
officer and probationer that enabled specifiable duties to be undertaken. These duties were 
subsequently engraved into policy and practice during the next few decades (see XX and XX, 
2006: 25-47 for a summation of relevant documentation). 
 
It should be clarified that although duty is central to the primary legislation, probation was 
not constituted by, nor solely operated to, Kantian deontological ethics. There has always 
existed a complex set of arrangements between its original religious mission, construction as 
a state-directed practice, and the controlling interest of the Home Office (since May 2007 the 
Ministry of Justice). Probation may well have been entrusted with the performance of 
numerous duties instead of punishment and prison. However, definitions of moral and legal 
duty were positioned obliquely to the instrumental function of reducing crime and preventing 
reoffending. Such tensions became more acute after the Morison Committee (Home Office, 
1962), but this should not preclude restating that probation duty was for several decades a 
central component of settled criminal justice and penal-welfare conventions (Garland, 2001). 
This settled convention was disrupted in the 1970s. 
 
The path of duty abandoned 
Towards the end of the 1970s, Haxby observed that the 'probation and after-care service has 
never been free from change, but at present it is at a crucial stage in its development. Many 
changes have been imposed on it recently by legislation and administrative decision, and 
other changes are pending' (1978: 15). By splicing Haxby’s assessment to the Review of 
Criminal Justice Policy (Home Office, 1977), it is of specific interest to reconstruct an era of 
transformative features that are worthy of historical notation: 
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 In 1966 probation became responsible for welfare posts in prisons. 
 The Criminal Justice Act 1967 re-named probation the Probation and After-Care 
Service to reflect its expanding duties. 
 Parole was introduced in 1968 which signified the ideological continuity with a prison 
system orientated towards rehabilitation, both during and beyond custodial release. 
Also, the Seebohm Committee presented an acute dilemma: if probation rejected 
proposals to become part of the re-organised local authority social service 
departments, it risked isolation from mainstream social work through closer 
identification with the penal system. By contrast, if it cooperated it risked 
assimilation, the loss of identity and autonomy as a separate service. 
 The Children and Young Persons Act 1969 marked the apotheosis of welfare for 
young offenders that complemented the rehabilitative ideal, or penal-welfare that 
anchored adult criminal justice services. Probation assumed responsibility for social 
work posts in remand centres, detention centres, and borstal allocation centres. 
 By 1970 plans were afoot to expand further probation responsibilities. 
 In 1971 the Central Council for the Education and Training in Social Work was 
established under whose arrangements probation officers as social workers of the 
courts were trained, alongside local authority social work and psychiatric social work 
students. 
 The Criminal Justice Act 1972 introduced the Community Service Order. 
Additionally, probation asserted its determination to retain its identity as a separate 
organisation in England and Wales. 
 The Powers of the Criminal Courts Act 1973 piloted community service schemes in 
six probation areas. 
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 In 1974 IMPACT (Folkard et al., 1974, 1976) questioned the rehabilitative efficacy of 
probation practice, and Brody (1976) the deterrent effects of sentencing. The Younger 
Report on Young Adult Offenders accentuated debates over care and control and the 
future direction of probation work. 
 By 1975 there was a worsening economic climate which restricted the expansion of 
probation, even though Probation Committees were given the opportunity to introduce 
community service schemes in their local areas. 
The Review (Home Office, 1977) constitutes a site of historical interest for criminal justice 
scholars, managers and practitioners, but of greater interest is the tonal quality of its 
deliberations. Not only, in conjunction with Haxby, does it summarise developmental turning 
points in penal policy affecting probation, prisons, and the police in the years approaching 
and including the 1970s, it also provides insights into the philosophical and cultural platform 
of government towards criminal and social justice. Although the 1970s were increasingly 
afflicted by fiscal pressure in a more competitive global economy, policies towards criminal 
justice reflected economic contingencies and humanitarian concerns (Home Office, 1977: 3). 
The humanitarian dimension was manifested in Home Office support for probation work and 
corresponding attempts to reduce the prison population. It was acknowledged that custodial 
sentences have a deterrent effect, but they also inflict damage on young offenders and must 
be avoided where possible. Government policy towards, and organisational practices within, 
the criminal justice system were approaching the historical juncture when economy and 
efficiency, value for money, managerial and bureaucratic rationality, would assume greater 
significance than formerly. However, rehabilitation remained the hegemonic ideology if 
increasingly questioned by research; probation had a significant role in criminal and social 
justice; and the legal and moral obligation of duty articulated in 1907 remained intact. Robert 
Harris (1977, 1980) enriched Haxby’s analysis that since the mid-1960s and following the 
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comprehensive Morison report (Home Office, 1962), the probation system had experienced 
bouts of rapid change and expansion. Crucially, the service was drawn towards the centre of 
penal policy that challenged its original mission and dissonance emerged at three levels. First, 
moral dissonance is the gap between the welfare ideology of personal social services, social 
work, probation practice, and the justice ideology of society. Second, technical dissonance is 
the gap between the task of reducing crime and the empirical failure to do so (see Brody, 
1976). Third, operational dissonance constitutes what was referred to as the care and control 
dilemma.  
 
Criminal justice and penal policy are complex matters, not least because they reflect and 
reproduce the interests of conflicting ideological and political constituencies. It is a field 
replete with contradiction, continuity and discontinuity, differences of degree and kind, and 
where strategic political posturing gets muddled with the objectives of criminal and social 
justice. The criminal justice system is forged by strategic political alliances, the election 
cycle, keeping an eye on public and penal appearances, ideological and axiological 
conviction across a wide spectrum of political, professional, and organisational interests. 
‘What Works’ and the appeal of community rehabilitation contend with prisons that do and 
don’t work (see Crow, 2001). We also know that there has always been an uneasy alliance 
between the contrasting moral perspectives of care and control, welfare and punishment, 
rehabilitation, treatment, and justice, community orders and prison sentences, public sector 
probation, private sector solutions, and market driven operations. These matters have been 
negotiated under different politico-economic and socio-ethical systems. 
 
Critically, attention to moral issues and ethical duty has not kept pace with political, 
legislative, economic, and administrative developments in the criminal justice domain. 
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Although these conundrums have become more acute over recent decades, Harris presciently 
sought a resolution at the end of the 1970s by separating the care and control function 
through creating two separate organisations. In other words, detach community corrections 
and the statutory supervision of court orders from the delivery of probation services. This 
would allow probation to become a court-based social work service to a disadvantaged 
section of the community. It would honour its moral obligation and legislative duty to 
provide help and support with accommodation, social security, employment, counselling 
services, enhance social skills, address personal and family problems. Harris qualified his 
resolution by clarifying that he was more interested in theoretical efficacy, rather than 
practical implications. Nevertheless, and on reflection, I think his main concern was to 
preserve the caring and personalist tradition of probation work, as a manifestation of moral 
obligation which is of value for its own sake. However, the proposals advanced were not 
implemented by the incoming conservative government in 1979, which resulted in the path of 
duty being diluted. This had serious implications during the 1980s and up to the present that 
can be reviewed briefly within the scope of this article. 
 
Kantian ethics, probation duty, and moral disturbances: 1979-2015 
Caution is required when evaluating the nature and scope of criminal justice after 1979. 
There was no pre-emptive strike in the direction of the great moving right show (Farrall and 
Jennings, 2014; Hall, 1983) as the 1980s were an Indian summer of liberal consensus 
(Faulkner, 2014). Undoubtedly, there is evidence of seeping governmental interference, a 
more energetic political interest in performance and efficiency, the spreading attraction of 
market discipline, a growing disenchantment with rehabilitation and treatment. Although 
Mrs. Thatcher, as prime minister, positioned herself to the right of her first Home Secretary, 
Mr. Whitelaw, it is often overlooked that conservative governments throughout the 1980s 
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remained committed to reducing imprisonment (Faulkner, 2014: 139). There was more 
continuity with the tone of labour’s Review (Home Office, 1977) than what transpired only a 
few years later with the outbreak of retributive punishment and prison expansion. 
Significantly, though, the duty to advise, assist, and befriend, a foundational moral and legal 
requirement since the 1907 Act, was initially diluted and then finally deleted after probation 
was manoeuvred to deliver punishment in the community by the Criminal Justice Act 1991. 
 
The conditions of existence for the development of criminal justice, probation, and penal 
policy that provoked moral questions were transformed during 1992-97. Beginning in 
October 1993, Michael Howard announced his 27 point plan on law and order which 
abandoned the aforementioned liberal penal-welfare consensus. There is evidence of populist 
criminalisation, the deeper penetration of punishment and prison into criminal justice 
consciousness, and the emergence of harsher conventions towards offenders contingent upon 
the decline of professional autonomy and discretion. This prised open a moral void within the 
system, indexed by a politics of disenchantment towards probation. Populist punitive 
expressivism, managerial and bureaucratic aggrandizement, political opportunism, and the 
closer alignment of criminal justice with electoral politics, proceed beyond preoccupation 
with the moral foundation of criminal and social justice. This was a defining period when the 
structure of moral regulation was subjected to the politics of disavowal, imposed from above 
by governmental fiat, not emerging organically from within the system itself. 
 
Students of criminal justice learn quickly that it is a field replete with paradox. When new 
labour came to power in 1997, intellectual assent was awarded to the empirical linkage 
between adverse socio-economic conditions and crime (see Home Office, 1977). But, at the 
same time, did not abandon the salience attached to punishment and prison under the 
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previous conservative dispensation. Helena Kennedy stated 'That Labour took the decision to 
continue Michael Howard’s incarceration binge is one of the blackest marks against the 
government’s record on social justice' (2005: 283). There was no relief from the new public 
management (Faulkner and Burnett, 2012: 168) and encroachment of privatisation. Probation 
was out of step with a modernising agenda that displaced old labour values of social work, 
personal social services, duty and moral obligation to deliver compensatory welfare services. 
Significantly, there was insufficient critical evaluation of the shifting intellectual and moral 
landscape, or implications of the legislative, administrative-bureaucratic, politico-economic, 
and ideological-material energies that had been released to re-configure the system (see XX, 
2015a). Instead, a robust politics of centrally imposed power and control erupted in the 
formation of the National Probation Service (NPS) in 2001, followed by the National 
Offender Management Service (NOMS) in 2003-04 (Carter, 2003). The rationale for bringing 
prisons and probation together through NOMS was to improve end-to-end management, 
enhance performance and instrumental effectiveness, continue the efficiency drive, and to 
establish a platform of contestability that exposed criminal justice services to a mixed 
economy of public, private, and voluntary enterprises. This was later consolidated in the 
Offender Management Act 2007. Further reforms to NOMS were initiated during 2008-09 
(Carter, 2007) to coordinate and commission all probation and prison services from the 
public, private, and voluntary sectors. This brings us to the threshold and defining period of 
coalition government between 2010 and 2015. 
 
Content analysis of relevant documentation that began with Prisons With A Purpose 
(Conservative Party, 2008), culminating on the 29th October 2014 with the announcement on 
the 21 Community Rehabilitation Companies that privatised the bulk of probation work, 
reveal a discernible turn of events in the intellectual, moral, and material reconstruction of the 
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system. All relevant documents (see XX, 2015a for detailed analysis) refer to payment by 
results (XX, 2015b) that constitute the transference of fiscal risk from taxpayers to the new 
providers through a process of competition between the sectors. The emerging system is 
designed to address the prison population that has doubled since 1993, retributive punishment 
that displaced rehabilitation, reconviction rates that remain too high and costly, and excessive 
legislative activity that was a decisive feature under new labour. The principles of the 
Rehabilitation Revolution, emblematic of 2010-15, are public protection, punishment and 
rehabilitation, transparency and accountability, and the decentralisation of services (Ministry 
of Justice, 2010). The reform of public services and realignment of the public-private sphere 
is constructed as a key modernising and progressive cause, exemplified by competition, 
privatisation, and marketisation. Financial rationalisation, value for money, outcomes not 
outputs, target achievement, risk and reward, business models and commercial practices, 
constitute the system’s central operating features. Consequently, the system is unrecognisable 
compared to the Review (Home Office, 1977) and the inchoate process of change during the 
1980s. The past was a different place, intellectually and morally, compared to developments 
from 1992, after 1997 during the new labour era, and by the end of the coalition government 
in May 2015. 
 
Restructuring and rebalancing have disturbed the dialectics of justice by eroding historical, 
ethical, and cultural conventions that found expression in the categories of duty and moral 
obligation. There is an absence of reasoned debate on the moral foundations of criminal 
justice to guide the system in its judgements and decisions. Unless the system has a 
determinate moral foundation, it is constantly in danger of being manipulated by contingent 
conditions and the politics of electoral calculation. The Ministry of Justice (2013) consulted 
on 19 questions appertaining to the Rehabilitation Revolution, but not one of these questions 
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addressed the foundational requirements of ethics and justice. Furthermore, although the 
House of Commons Justice Committee (2014) elucidated that the programme of reform would 
extend statutory rehabilitation to those sentenced to less than 12 months (additional 50,000 
offenders); expose rehabilitation services to a diverse market of providers and new payment 
mechanisms; establish a new National Probation Service involved in public protection; and 
re-organise the prison estate; it remained silent on the interconnected thematics of morality 
and justice. On Wednesday 29th October, 2014, the decision was announced on the successful 
bidders for the 21 Community Rehabilitation Companies: Sodexo Justice Services in 
partnership with NACRO (6 areas), Achieving Real Change in Communities (ARCC) (1), 
Purple Futures (5), The Reducing Reoffending Partnership (2), Working Links (3), Geo 
Mercia Willowdene (1), MTCNovo (2), and Seetec (1). 
 
These are the main features of system reconstruction since the 1980s that provoke intellectual 
and moral questions that urgently require an intellectual and moral response. There was 
evidentially a significant turn of events in 1992-93, little respite after 1997, and now the 
revolutionary enterprise of 2010-15 clamours for attention. There are accumulating deposits 
of disquiet posing serious questions of a moral nature, indexed most clearly in the probation 
question and its enforced decline as a source of ethico-cultural contestation to the forces of 
retributive punishment and prison. This is highlighted by eliminating the duty to advise, 
assist, and befriend from governmental policies and organisational practices, troublesome for 
a people-facing organisation. A case must be advanced to reanimate questions and issues 
appertaining to moral obligation. This can be pursued through engaging with Kantian 
deontological ethics, to alter the terms of debate and the ground on which it is conducted to 
wrest back the initiative from the modernisers and rebalancers who prosecute their case with 
revolutionary zeal. Before advancing this case, it is beneficial to be reminded of the Kantian 
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concepts of significance: a priori, good will, duty, motives, moral consciousness and 
obligation, moral law, ends over means, and respect for human personality. 
 
Critical discussion 
There are self-evident differences between practical moral reason and instrumental reason; 
qualitative service outputs and targeted measurable outcomes; motives and consequences; the 
kingdom of ends and calculable means. These binary conflicts manifested within macro 
politico-economic systems; mezzo institutional arrangements; micro human subjectivity and 
interpersonal relations (Hall, 2012); reflect and reproduce moral philosophies differentially 
resonant of Kantian deontological ethics and Benthamite utility. Governmental approaches 
towards, and accompanying practices within, people-facing organisations – from probation, 
criminal justice and youth justice, to health, education, and welfare – can be structured by 
competing moral philosophies. This is pertinently illustrated by subjecting probation, 
criminal justice, and penal policy, to the lens of ethical scrutiny which empirically 
demonstrates the ascent of instrumental rationality. This article directs attention to the moral 
transformation of the duty to advise, assist, and befriend, to the recalibrated instrumental goal 
of punishment in the community and subsequent ideological and material developments 
through 2010 to 2015. That is, from instead of punishment and prison, to closer association 
with punitive delivery systems, expanding custodial provision, the utility of What Works, 
privatisation and marketised competition. Additionally, the punitive volte face of 1992-93 
was a significant turning point, and the Prisons-Probation Review (Home Office, 1998) 
claimed that advise, assist, and befriend was no longer credible with the expectations of 
courts and transformations imposed by governmental fiat (but see XX, 2016 forthcoming). 
Specifically, the Acts of 1907 and 1991 constitute the legislative symbols of distinct 
historical, politico-economic eras, socio-moral conventions, organisational rationale and 
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responses. At the cusp of this transition Harris was troubled by the turn taken by the criminal 
justice system in the direction of technical, organisational, and specifically moral dissonance. 
Extrapolating Kantian concepts of significance located in the Groundwork to politically 
imposed transformations in the organisation of probation and criminal justice, intimates three 
substantive points of theoretical interest for consideration. 
 
Organisational a priori 
Although the pathway that culminated in the foundational legislation began in 1876 (XX and 
XX, 2006), the Probation of Offenders Act 1907 established the legal and moral title deeds. 
S.4 specified the inchoate mission’s ought in the duty to advise, assist, and befriend, 
consolidated between 1909 and 1962. The legislators inscribed a moral consciousness into 
the people-facing mission, illustrative of social and penal reforms undertaken by the 
reforming liberal government 1906-14. When making this assertion it is important not to 
ignore the complex politico-economic, social, and penological origins of probation. Young 
(1976), in a critical sociological essay on the early history of probation, argued that it 
emerged from within the middle class to stabilise the working class by draining away, or 
neutralising, recalcitrant threats to social order under an albeit reformed capitalist system. 
Probation officers and social workers were not left-idealist proto-revolutionaries agitating for 
the collapse of liberal capitalism, but inadvertently and unwittingly maintained it. This is a 
salient qualification to explanations of reform, constitutive of philanthropic and humanitarian 
impulses (Young and Ashton, 1956). Lurking below the surface of criminal justice reforming 
measures was a cunning exercise in strategic politics. Not so much to punish less but better 
(Foucault, 1977). Regardless of the interpretative weight attached to this dystopian reading, 
the 1907 Act legislated for moral agency in the duty to advise, assist, and befriend. Although 
probation’s mission to the courts was not overtly informed by Kantian deontological ethics, 
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its thematic resonance created the opportunity to cultivate ethical conventions in 
contradistinction to the blunt instruments of 19th century retributive penality. The moral 
conventions of probation were different to, and instead of, the attractions of punishment and 
prison. This ethical and cultural potentiality remained through the Criminal Justice Act 1948; 
Penal Practice in a Changing Society (Home Office, 1959); and the Morison report (Home 
Office, 1962). However, from the mid-1960s and into the 1970s there were accumulating 
deposits of moral dissonance that Harris correctly identified above. 
 
As elucidated earlier, Kant’s Groundwork advanced a metaphysics of morals that constituted 
an original contribution to moral philosophy during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
(Schneewind, 2003: 651). He blended Continental rationalism with British empiricism to 
theorise that some knowledge is given a priori independently of experience. Extrapolated to 
and reconstructed within probation, the duty to advise, assist, and befriend was a priori in the 
sense that it is a matter of logic, theoretical and philosophical argument that work with 
offenders, including the 21 community rehabilitation companies, requires attention to moral 
conventions. Probation was established instead of punishment and prison, and moral 
obligation was prior to, and independently of, politico-economic developments that have 
instrumentally transformed the criminal justice system. In a people-facing organisation 
structured by I-thou relations, there was a foundational legal and moral principle of duty to 
others that was preserved through mutating conditions from 1909 to the 1960s. In other 
words, it was not added as an after-thought, it did not emerge after trial and error. Rather, it 
existed from the beginning and constituted a mark of difference within the operational 
dialectics of criminal justice responses towards people who offend. Probation duty was a 
moral category given legitimacy by a legal precept. Law sanctioned the conscious operation 
of moral obligation. 
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This is undoubtedly an abstract philosophical and theoretical reconstructive argument 
informed by Kantian ethics, transposed into the practices of concrete organisational life. But 
a dose of abstract theory is required to analyse organisational convulsions since the 1980s, 
the Criminal Justice Act 1991 that endorsed punishment in the community, the moral reverses 
of 1992-93 exemplified in punitive and custodial excesses, and instrumental reasoning that 
has come to dominate the criminal justice domain. Moreover, abstract theory can be put to 
work to critique the new labour dispensation after 1997, culminating in 2010-15 with the 
demise of probation by ideological and material forces indifferent to ethico-cultural and 
historical conventions. This constitutes a recent history of relentless instrumental assaults on 
a priori duty that has eroded the foundational structure of moral obligation for others. It 
recounts a process of de-moralisation, a story of loss, the erosion of a moral pathway with 
implications for justice, right, and good will (for a full discussion see XX, 2015a). 
 
Organisational good will 
Organisational good will intimates the theoretical possibility of responses being intrinsically 
good and inherently right, rather than instrumentally useful. The duty to advise, assist, and 
befriend can be reconstructed as the definitive maxim constitutive of organisational good 
will. The delivery of social work and probation services to offenders in extremis may achieve 
‘nothing’ of instrumental significance. It may not always be useful or calculatingly beneficial 
at preventing crime or reducing re-offending. Nevertheless, it can ‘shine like a jewel for its 
own sake as something which has full value in itself’. It is politically and organisationally 
conceivable that social action can be good in itself, a rational response to the demand of duty 
and moral obligation, of intrinsic worth in responding to the claim of the other. Nevertheless, 
a Kantian-inspired moral philosophy that appeared 'at one of the great dividing points in the 
history of ethics' (MacIntyre, 1967: 190), and thematically resonated with probation duty, has 
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been unceremoniously destabilised. This is evidenced in organisational good will to advise, 
assist, and befriend being diluted by a post-ethical and cultural politics of instrumental utility 
that elevates quantifiable outcomes above the intrinsic qualitative moral worth of service 
outputs. In other words, the Kantian inspired concept and moral category of organisational 
good will was displaced by new public management with its managerial and administrative 
logic supportive of the  neoliberal capitalist order (XX, 2016). 
 
Organisational ought 
The operating logic of people-facing organisations embodies the requirement to demonstrate 
moral features that transcend instrumental reason, fiscal inducements (as in payment by 
results), and will to power over troublesome populations. These organisations ought to bear 
witness to moral categories that have a permanently binding quality. In other words, a 
fundamental and foundational moral ought transcending contingent historical conditions, the 
perennial threat of political manipulation for questionable motives, and strategic 
governmental tactics that manoeuvre organisations for overt political purposes during the 
cycle of electoral politics. It is demonstrably the case that the moral ought of probation work 
has been systematically undermined, most notably by the material forces of privatisation and 
marketisation. It has been demonstrated that from the late-1970s, in circumstances of moral 
dissonance, the political process applied to probation and criminal justice did not support the 
organisational ought of moral obligation to the other advocated by Harris (1977, 1980). 
Whatever moral and organisational autonomy prevailed in probation during the early 
decades, were swamped by repeated waves of ethico-cultural repudiation. The ethic of duty, 
as a foundational organisational ought, became expendable. Kuehn (2001: 241), in his 
insightful intellectual biography of Kant, elucidates that he addressed three questions: what 
can I know (epistemology); what ought I to do (morality); what may I hope for (teleology)? It 
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is the second which is foregrounded in this article. Therefore, the fundamental questions for 
people-facing organisations are: what ought we to do; what is the right thing to do; rather 
than what is useful and politically expedient? Organisational engagement with the moral 
ought of duty and obligation directly challenges what has been established, increasingly since 
the 1980s, as the orthodox paradigm. 
 
Conclusion 
Although this article is directly relevant for England and Wales, its arguments are pertinent 
for all national and international probation systems. Specifically, the European Probation 
Rules (number 13 refers to ethical and professional standards), in addition to the Probation 
Institute, articulate a codified system of ethical requirements that resonate with a Kantian-
inspired perspective. Accordingly, probation work within the criminal justice system, 
including the 21 community rehabilitation companies, ought not to be recalibrated by the 
demands of fiscal efficiency, commercial opportunities, or governmental will to power over 
troublesome populations. People-facing organisations must accentuate the dialectic of 
instrumental function and moral responsibility, facilitated by due diligence to concepts of 
significance derived from Kant’s Groundwork. Both sides in this politico-ethical debate must 
re-learn how to reason with each other. Nevertheless, this debate is confronted by a serious 
problem, which is the expanding platform of neoliberal capitalism. It is one thing to analyse, 
critique, and re-energise the moral components of people-facing organisations, but what of 
the broader picture? As well as organisational critique and the legitimate demand for moral 
reconstruction, what of taking forward political critique that confronts the debasement of the 
shining jewel and journey towards the civilisational ideal? What has been witnessed over 
recent decades is not solely the diminishment of the probation ideal, but rather a concerted 
political assault on the ethico-social realm (Winlow and Hall, 2013). Consequently, the 
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renewal of duty and moral obligation within the parameters of people-facing organisations 
cannot occur in isolation from a genuinely political transformation that systematically 
establishes a new ethico-cultural foundation for civil society. The neoliberal capitalist order 
neither facilitates nor sustains the argument and theoretical proposition advocated above. This 
constitutes a radical disjuncture, a contemporary manifestation of dissonance. 
 
The former reproductive mechanisms of symbolic efficiency consisting of the probation 
ideal, rehabilitative ethic, the duty to advise, assist, befriend, and moral obligation, have been 
destabilised by exposure to forces indifferent to morality. The Keynesian nation state was 
replaced by the market state which has reconstructed organisational conventions according to 
the tightly packed isobars of privatisation, business networks, commercial transactions, 
investment opportunities, and competitive advantages, not foundational moral principles. 
Even though it is legitimate to argue for the resurgence of organisational ethics, it is 
undermined by structural limitations of moral indifference. This platform does not invalidate 
the burden of my argument, but it does present substantive limitations of scope. 
 
Fundamental politico-economic transformations are required to renew support for the ethico-
cultural and symbolic foundations of civil society. It is in the realm of politics proper where 
we need to raise basic questions of ethics and moral obligation that, in turn, has implications 
for the renewal of organisational life. With this in mind a case must be made for more Kant 
and less Bentham; more advise, assist and befriend and less punishment and prison; more 
attention to ethics and less to the material priorities of the market state; more intrinsic right 
than utility at the political and organisational level. It is in the realm of politics where we 
must urgently decide what kind of society we want to construct and the organisations we 
want to sustain it. This will involve the demanding task of forging a new rapprochement 
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between politics and ethics. Kuehn’s substantive intellectual biography of Kant stated that 
'True morality is an ideal yet to be instantiated in the world, but it is the only ideal worth 
striving for' (2001: 286). Accordingly, rational statecraft has a duty to confront political 
economy with the moral and civilisational ideal that shines like a jewel, and incorporate 
Kantian concepts of significance into organisational life.  
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